The changing social and economic position of the Trade
Changes in the social and economic position of the Trade, particularly regarding the English brewers, were at the root of this change. Beginning in 1887, the large Burton and London breweries were floated on the stock exchange. Following this, the 1890s saw a surge in beer sales and speculative fever about the fortunes of the drink industry, fuelled by a ready availability of cheap money, low raw material prices and buoyant consumer demand as a result of high wages in the economic boom. 1 Competition, particularly in London, was fierce and the large brewers responded by an aggressive policy of purchasing public houses directly and swallowing up smaller breweries, often for the sake of their tied-houses. Whitbread's, for example, doubled its nominal share capital between its flotation in 1889 and 1901, and its leasehold and freehold properties which had been valued at £26,430 in 1886 were set at nearly £2 million by 1907. The Burton brewers followed suit and Allsopp, in particular, pursued a reckless policy of purchase, paying prices many considered 'insane'. 2 The boom decade of the 1890s was followed by a sharp downturn in fortunes after 1900 as 'conditions changed with remarkable rapidity'. 3 Per capita, beer consumption fell annually after 1899. Economic recession was partly to blame, but there were also other underlying factors: the rapid shift of working-class expenditure towards consumer durables and the availability of alternatives for leisure expenditure, such as football and cheap railway excursions. Not all sections of the Trade were equally badly hit, as there was a shift towards the consumption of bottled beer at home and more competition from clubs. Many of the largest giants of the industry had been investing heavily in public house property at the very time when the pub was losing its preeminent position as a focus of working-class leisure and culture. 4 The London brewers were particularly badly hit after 1900, with annual reported declines in barrelage of between 2 and 7 per cent. 5 These changes had two political implications. In the first place, the leading breweries, being overexposed in public house property, were particularly sensitive to attempts at compulsory licence reduction. Secondly, as public companies, large brewers now had to be accountable to a wider public, both for their investment decisions and the conduct of their business. This posed problems once business experienced a downturn after the heady euphoria of the flotation period, but it also presented opportunities. The Trade was no longer a narrow sectional economic interest, but instead could pose as the representative of a major legitimate public interest. Much propaganda could therefore be made of 'widows and orphans', whose welfare depended upon income from brewery dividends and who would suffer if 'confiscatory' schemes were passed. In many ways the temperance lobby and unwelcome government action could provide a lightning conductor that could distract attention away from the mismanagement of some of the large firms, which in the case of Allsopp had been nothing short of catastrophic. The position of the Trade could therefore be moulded much more easily into a more general clash of interest between capital and the collectivist state. Already this had been apparent with the close links between the Trade and the libertarian Liberty and Property Defence League in the 1880s. 6 For temperance reformers, on the other hand, the new potential ability of the Trade to mobilise a vast swathe of shareholders among the ordinary public was an added cause of alarm. For decades the temperance lobby had fulminated against the 'Our Trade, Our Politics'
